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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
III. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
SuccESsIoNS, DONATIONS AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
Succession of Land1 reiterates the rule that "where there are no
debts of a succession, and hothing will be gained by the holding of
an administration, the appointment of an administrator will not be
ordered if opposed by those in interest."2 The application of the
rule was particularly appropriate here where the heirs had by formal
judgment been put into possession of all of the property of the
succession. Whatever the altercation between the heirs, which could
be settled by other means, it was certainly unnecessary to burden
the estate with the expense and delay of an administration.
White v. Succession of Candebad' was concerned with proof of
debt for services rendered to the deceased. Act 207 of 1906 and
Act 11 of 1926 were the guides.4 The claim was filed against the
estate within the year following death. The district court had
awarded $1250 on a quantum merit basis and this judgment was
left undisturbed.
In a petitory action to recover a tract of land in Caddo Parish,
the defendant in Arnett v. Marshall' relied principally upon the
allegation of forgery. Thus the opinion is chiefly concerned with
proof of signatures. In finding that plaintiff's deed was valid the
court made an interesting observation regarding the testimony of
handwriting experts:
"All testimony in proof of handwriting, except where the
witness has seen it actually performed rests upon the principle
of comparison; and, although admissible and is to be weighed
by the court, it is merely evidence of opinion. Succession of
McDonogh, 18 La. Ann. 419. Such evidence must yield when
pitted against positive testimony as to the actual writing."6
The defendant lost the rest of the tract in question because of having
accepted unconditionally the succession of the one from whom he
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 31 So. (2d) 601 (La. 1947).
2. 81 So. (2d) 607, 609.
8. 210 La. 995, 29 So. (2d) 89 (1946).
4. La. Act 207 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1989) §§ 2024, 2025]; La. Act 11 of
1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2024, 2025].
5. 210 La. 932, 28 So. (2d) 665 (1946).
6. 210 La. 932, 943, 28 So. (2d) 665, 668.
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claimed. Thus, he was held for all "debts and obligations" including
the warranty of the title which he now questioned.
Thompson v. Thompson" presents most interesting questions
and there seems to be the same difference of opinion among students
of the law regarding solutions as there was upon the supreme bench
of the state. From the facts it appears that a husband and father
with seven children executed a sale of certain property to his son.
A counter letter was issued showing that the sale was simulated and
that no consideration was received. The sale was recorded but the
counter letter was not. The simulated vendee gave an option to a
third person, some eleven years after the death of the father. The
option contract was recorded. The holder of the option attempted
to exercise his right and the main question to be answered is whether
the right of the forced heirs to bring the property back to the suc-
cession under the rules of simulation' was greater or less than that
of the holder of the option, depending on the record, to enforce
specific performance. The majority of the court decided in favor of
the forced heirs. In this case, the deed did not show that the transfer
was between father and son, hence, the court indicated that had the
actual transfer been accomplished, then McDuffie v. Walker9 and
the public policy involved would have protected the third person.
However, title yet remained in the son with an outstanding option
right in the hands of a holder without knowledge of the right of
the forced heirs to upset the sale as having been simulated. Thus
the case was still in the category of the McDuffie v. Walker and
Watson v. Bethany"° decisions. Having set forth this analysis, the
court then took the position that this simulated sale was indeed a
donation in disguise and that every donation where forced heirs are
in existence, passes but a qualified ownership which remains in this
uncertain state so long as this outstanding right in forced heirs to
protect their legitime remains. The five year prescription on reduc-
tion, not having been pleaded, was unavailable. Since title was not
in the option giver, specific performance would not lie and the
holder of the option was remitted to a damage suit. The result of
this decision is eminently satisfactory to those who believe that pro-
tection of the legitime is an even more important policy than that
of faith in the record. However, the theory of distinction between
the right to reduce and the right to declare a simulation has been
7. 211 La. 468, 80 So. (2d) 821 (1947).
8. Art. 2289, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
10. 209 La. 989, 26 So. (2d) 12 (1946).
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fairly well rooted hitherto and this decision may give trouble in the
future since it has been understood and indeed expressed in this
case that in gifts title passes subject to defeasance in whole or in
part by suit to reduce, personal to the forced heirs-while a simula-
tion leaves title where it was having been merely uncovered by
forced heirs or by creditors of the simulated vendor. The prescrip-
tion applicable obviously is different, also. The combination of
theories leaves the reader in some confusion for while the transaction
was a simulation and was partly treated as such, the principles of
reduction of donations were applied.
The claim of the widow in community under Article 2404 pro-
hibiting donations by husband of immovables of the community lost
under the analysis of the Watson v. Bethany case and the faith of the
record policy so far as the option holder was concerned. Under the
theory that the forced heirs had the property returned to the succes-
sion of the deceased husband for the recovery of their legitime, the
widow was then able to assert her right to half of it as community
property.
DONATIONS
The case of Clanton v. Shattuck" is concerned with evaluating
evidence regarding the sanity of a testator. The presumption of
mental normalcy was found to have been overcome by the evidence,
particularly letters written on the same day that the will was con-
fected which convinced the court that the testator was not sane when
he wrote the will whatever his state of mental health might have
been on certain other occasions.
Proof of holographic will is the concern of Succession of
lmwolde."2 The document was found to be in its entirety in the
handwriting of the testatrix. The fact that she left her property to
her cousin rather than her nieces was not peculiar as she never saw
the latter and maintained close relationships with the cousin.
The interpretation of a clause of an holographic will written
in French concerned the court in Succession of Montegut.' Testatrix
was unmarried and left no forced heirs. After making several par-
ticular bequests following the opening words "I leave" the testatrix
then stated "5 hundred for settling my estate which I leave to Charles
St. Martin and to Pat Monegut, as the executor of my testament."1 4
11. 211 La. 750, 30 So. (2d) 823 (1947).
12. 210 La. 1019, 29 So. (2d) 48 (1946).
13. 211 La. 112, 29 So. (2d) 588 (1947).
14. 211 La. 112, 29 So. (2d) 583, 585.
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Though there was unanimity of opinion that the statement was
ambiguous, expert French grammarians split four to four on inter-
pretation as to whether the two named individuals were universal
legatees or particular legatees for five hundred dollars. Presumptions
in such cases culled from the jurisprudence were in conflict. The
court very properly relied on Articles 1714, 1715, and 1716 stating
in general that when the intention of the testator cannot be deter-
mined from the text of the will that extrinsic evidence must be
considered. The case was remanded for the "restricted purpose"
of collecting this evidence.
A special legacy followed the clause which might be a universal
bequest and the court saw no objection to that as the same result
often had been found in codicils.
A note appears in this issue wherein the Succession of Lambert"
is fully discussed. Certainly there is much room for difference of
opinion regarding phraseology which will fall within the pattern of
a conjoint legacy as outlined by Article 1707. However, it seems
unfortunate that the matter cannot be put to rest at least so far as
these expressions which seem to come so handily to draftsmen are
concerned. Certainly, lawyers will do well to avoid the red flag
phrases-as "share and share alike." Writers of holographic testa-
ments however, will doubtless continue to use these easy words
which to the layman at least must seem to convey a clear meaning.
Suit was instituted by two daughters in Faison v. Patout6 to
obtain recognition as owners of certain jewelry said to have been
received as a manual gift from their deceased mother. Before her
death, the mother in presence of three persons, one of whom was
one of the daughters, gave a box to the latter saying, "My jewelry
I give to my two daughters." After that the mother never had
custody or control over the jewelry. Under the plain provisions of
Article 1539 of the Civil Code, the gift was perfect. The items were
later in the keeping of the brother, now dead, but he was acting as
a depository and was keeping the valuables not for himself but for
his sisters. Prescription did not begin to run until the daughters
were refused the possession of their property by the widow of the
brother, only six months before suit was filed; thus the plea of the
ten year prescription on personal actions under Article 3544 of the
Code was unavailing.
15. 210 La. 636, 28 So. (2d) 1 (1946).
16. 81 So. (2d) 416 (La. 1947).
17. 81 So. (2d) 412 (La. 1947).
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COMMUNrrY PROPERTY
The contest in Losavio v. Losavio Realty Company1 is chiefly
between father and son. The latter claimed that he had an interest
in his mother's succession and that his father had been guilty of
fraud per se when he organized a corporation, the assets of which
were the property of the community, since he made this move after
he learned that his wife had but a very short time to live. The court
found no fraud for although the motive was clear that the father
wished to keep control as president and almost, complete owner of
the corporation, he concealed nothing, had continued the incor-
porated business, had probated his wife's will, had not failed to
account to his ten children and in fact, plaintiff was himself an
officer in the corporation. The case of Wainer v. Wainer 8 was
clearly distinguished on its facts which showed failure to account,
concealment and disposition of assets.
Mrs. Land left a son and daughter and a will leaving everything
to her daughter in the Succession of Land." The son seeks to recover
his legitime and also to distinguish between the separate property of
his mother and property that had belonged to the community which
had existed between his mother and his deceased father. His portion
of his father's one-half of the community would be one-half or one-
fourth of the whole plus one-fourth of one-half or one-eighth of his
mother's part under the will so he stood to receive three-eighths of
the community property and two-eighths of the separate estate.
Proof in connection with each item of both his father's and mother's
succession was most carefully considered. The daughter pleaded
that certain bonds had been given her by the mother during her
lifetime as her name was written on the envelope containing the
bonds and a gift indicated. This gift of an incorporeal was invalid
as not having been made before a notary and two witnesses-the
stock transfer act pleaded by counsel having nothing to do with it.
Gifts of certain jewelry fell as lacking delivery necessary to the
manual gift. Again the court stated that labels of property in income
tax returns were not to be accepted against positive proof of their real
nature. War Savings Bonds issued to mother and daughter as co-
owners were declared separate property of the daughter under the
regulations of the United States Government regarding such bonds.
Fleming v. Fleming" simply stands for the well known prin-
ciple that property bought during the community is presumed
18. 210 La. 324. 26 So. (2d) 829 (1946).
19. 31 So. (2d) 609 (La. 1947).
20. 211 La. 860, 30 So. (2d) 860 (La. 1947).
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community. Since there was no rebuttal of this presumption, the
heirs of the mother could claim as against the father a one-half
interest in a certain partnership. The couple moved here from
another state and brought funds with them with which they bought
certain stock later transferred to the partnership. No question of
usufruct was mentioned in the opinion.
Capillon v. Chambliss2 ' instances a case where the presumption
of community was rebutted by a wife and the husband's step-
daughter to whom certain property had been sold. The rule was
again stated that while under homestead association laws and for
their purposes the usual sale and resale are what they are labelled
yet this procedure does not have the effect of converting separate
property into community property as the double transaction is in
fact but one and that a security device.
Mrs. Betz sued her husband for a separation of property where-
upon he sued for separation of bed and board on ground of abandon-
ment and obtained judgment. He appeared regarding the property
decree only and hence Betz v. Riviere" is concerned with the ques-
tion of whether certain property was separate or community. A
recapitulation of the long and involved recitation of the many trans-
actions would serve no useful purpose. Settled rules of community
property were applied. The couple had been married more than
thirty years. The wife had worked outside her home for a salary
for twenty-nine years besides dealing extensively in real estate with
money and property definitely separate. She had supported the
home. Justice Fournet observed that during the marriage the hus-
band had given her a total of two hundred dollars. The question of
whether a donation of realty with reserve of usufruct is valid or not
was mentioned but unanswered as not having been raised by a party
at interest. The following statement regarding the evidential value
of income tax returns in determining whether property is separate
or community is of interest:
"While it is true that the filing of community income tax
returns may be used as evidence against the wife's contention
that property in her name is not her separate property, such
evidence is not conclusive. Evidence of this character may be
weighed against the wife when the evidence offered by her
otherwise to establish the separate status of property is not satis-
factory or there is some doubt as to its separate status. In this
21. 211 La. 1, 29 So. (2d) 171 (1946).
22. 211 La. 43, 29 So. (2d) 465 (1947).
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case, however, the paraphernality of the funds which the prop-
erty claimed by Mrs. Riviere was acquired has been established
by an overwhelming preponderance of the evidence."'
Since in this issue a note appears discussing the case of Paline v.
Heroman24 it would be repetitious to outline the case here. The
writer would like to observe merely that the interpretation of Articles
915 and 1022 particularly is so startling as to cause alarm for the
future, should this case be used as a guide to further decisions.
Roccaforte v. Barbin25 stands for the community property prin-
ciple that when property stands in the joint names of husband and
wife that the wife alone may not bind it. Furthermore, the court
found that other interested persons than the husband may complain
since Articles 134 and 1791 of the Revised Civil Code were in refer-
ence to separate property of the wife and before the passage of the
married women's emancipatory acts.
The authors of both majority and minority opinions in Easter-
ling v. Succession of Lam kin28 agreed on the rule that life insurance
policies payable to the "insured, or to his executors, administrators
or assigns" take the stamp of separate or community property accord-
ing to the marital status of the insured at the date of the issuance of
the policy. This idea seems to follow the general rule of title. The
difference of opinion expressed in this case was on the matter of
disability payments due the insured after his marriage on policies
issued before the marriage. The majority of the court, through
Chief Justice O'Niell, took the view that since the disability hap-
pened during the marriage, the payments were a community asset
payable "in lieu of or as compensation for the loss of the earning
capacity of the insured."27  Since the payments depended on the
future uncertain event of disability which had not happened at the
time of the marriage nothing of value was brought "into the mar-
riage" under that phrase as found in Article 2334 of the Civil Code.
The Chief Justice stated that he arrived at the conclusion that these
disability payments were community property by a process of elimi-
nating the various kinds of property declared by the Code to be
separate property. The position taken by Justice Hawthorne in his
dissenting opinion was that title vested as of the date of the policy
to all rights under the policy whether they were dependent upon
23. 211 La. 43, 29 So. (2d) 465, 472.
24. 211 La. 64, 29 So. (2d) 478 (1946).
26. 81 So. (2d) 521 (La. 1947).
26. 81 So. (2d) 220 (La. 1947).
27. 81 So. (2d) 220, 224.
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the happening of future uncertain events or not and that the right
was of value and was brought "into the marriage" and hence was
separate. The dissenting justice pointed out of course that under this
view the community should be credited with such premiums as had
been paid from community assets. While it was true that payments
would not be due unless disability occurred, certainly they could
not have been due without the policy and under that title the right
arose. The minority view seems more logical to the writer. Since
deceased left no parents or descendants, the widow received all of
the community under 915, as well as the death benefits coming to
her as beneficiary.
Succession of Chavis sets forth claims for two women contend-
ing for half of the property of their deceased husband. The second
marriage was declared putative as to the wife and children. The
husband clearly was in bad faith. The only property involved was
acquired during the putative marriage and hence was property of
the second community and the putative wife was awarded one-half
of it. The children of the two marriages were awarded the other
half in equal shares. The old Spanish rule2" in such cases was not
mentioned. The court indicated that the legal wife was undeserving.
Furthermore, the property in question was acquired after judgment
of separation of bed and board from the first wife so there was no
community existing between husband and first wife when the prop-
erty was acquired and hence wife number one would still have
received nothing had there been no second marriage, putative or
otherwise.
Two deeds caused the litigation in Robinson v. Marks."° The
first was a sale of land to the wife. The second was a sale of mineral
rights by the wife to the vendor of the land. The attempt was to
declare the second deed void as the property was community and
the transfer was signed by the wife only. Upon these facts alone
obviously the title from the community would fall. However, it
developed that these two transfers were one and the same transaction
necessitated by the error in the first deed of failing to reserve the
minerals as understood by all parties to the original contract. Thus,
title to the minerals in question had never really passed from the
vendor of the land, the second deed purporting to transfer them
having been but an integral part of the deal to purchase land.
28. 211 La. 813, 29 So. (2d) 860 (1947).
29. See Daggett, Community Property System of Louisiana (1945) 119. Re-
printed with addenda.
80. 211 La. 452, 30 So. (2d) 200 (1947).
